So, the topic for theology this week was religious experience, and its nature. I feel moved to discuss it here, if only to clarify to myself how I feel about it. Somebody should probably stop me.
Some - many, in fact - theologians hold that there is a universal experience of the divine or supernatural. Some, like Friedrich Schleiermacher, hold that it is the experience of a sense of 'absolute dependency' on a greater power, or, like H.D. Lewis, argue that it comes from an apprehension of the limitations of human existence and the human world and the awareness or feeling that there must exist some unconsidered, infinite, or absolute being beyond human existence and upon which human existence is utterly dependent. (Others, like Feuerbach, contend that 'God' is a projection of human desires, but that's not entirely germane to my discussion.)
Theologians who generalise from their own specific experience of religion overlook one thing, however: the problem of the observer.
The problem with constructing theories from specific or personal experience in theology or philosophy is similar to the problem of adjusting for bias in science: one cannot, quite literally cannot, divorce the observer from the thing observed. Thus all conclusions that the Observer reaches about the Phenomenon (unless one takes adequate care to adjust for bias, which is sometimes done in science and never in philosophy or theology) are therefore coloured by the Observer's preconceptions.
'Religious experience' can be intrepreted in different ways. The experiences which believers term 'religious' could be communications from an absolute Being or reality; or they could be an effect of the brain chemicals; or they could be some mix of the two; or nothing of significance at all.
But if one is raised with religion*, in a culture wherein belief in a supreme Deity is the rule rather than the exception, is one not predisposed to view such experiences as communications from the specific Deity which one has been raised to think is present and active in the world? If one is a Christian, one would be predisposed to believe it was God or the Christ, if Muslim, Allah, if Jewish, YHWH, not so?
So how, therefore, can a theologian generalise from their specific experience to a 'universal' theory of religious experience, and thus the validation of a specific framework of belief?
I mean, I've had 'religious' experiences, and I'm a freaking agnostic.**
(I was a deist at the time, and felt quite comforted by the thought that there was Something out there. I've since come to believe it was a false comfort, and self-deluding. There is no redemption and no absolution, and if nothing has meaning, then everything must, and one owes it to oneself and the world to be the best, most decent freaking human being one can be.)
I still have 'religious' experiences, in fact, only now I intrepret them in terms of fluctuations of the brain chemicals. So what makes my interpretations less valid, in the eyes of certain sections of society, than anyone else's, simply because I prefer not to believe in a Deus Pater? Or, for that matter, in the authenticity of revealed scripture?***
*
*Note that my experience and field of study is with Christian religion, and that I'm an agnostic and a skeptic by inclination. As such I hope to wear my biases on my sleeve.
**I was raised by the latest in a long line of Lapsed Catholics, attended a non-denominational - for which read Anglican - primary school and Catholic secondary one, and decided early I had no use for hypocrisy. My declared agnosticism is really a logical progression (from childhood Christianity through adolescent Deism to adult agnosticism) but you know, I still catch shit about it from some people. And not just when I call them on grounds of hypocrisy, either.
***I'm a historian-in-training. The Bible contradicts itself multiple times. If it was indeed 'inspired by God', then to paraphrase theologian Keith Ward, God was very definitely not interested in making himself clear - as a Omnipotent Being ought to be able to, if It so desired.
Some - many, in fact - theologians hold that there is a universal experience of the divine or supernatural. Some, like Friedrich Schleiermacher, hold that it is the experience of a sense of 'absolute dependency' on a greater power, or, like H.D. Lewis, argue that it comes from an apprehension of the limitations of human existence and the human world and the awareness or feeling that there must exist some unconsidered, infinite, or absolute being beyond human existence and upon which human existence is utterly dependent. (Others, like Feuerbach, contend that 'God' is a projection of human desires, but that's not entirely germane to my discussion.)
Theologians who generalise from their own specific experience of religion overlook one thing, however: the problem of the observer.
The problem with constructing theories from specific or personal experience in theology or philosophy is similar to the problem of adjusting for bias in science: one cannot, quite literally cannot, divorce the observer from the thing observed. Thus all conclusions that the Observer reaches about the Phenomenon (unless one takes adequate care to adjust for bias, which is sometimes done in science and never in philosophy or theology) are therefore coloured by the Observer's preconceptions.
'Religious experience' can be intrepreted in different ways. The experiences which believers term 'religious' could be communications from an absolute Being or reality; or they could be an effect of the brain chemicals; or they could be some mix of the two; or nothing of significance at all.
But if one is raised with religion*, in a culture wherein belief in a supreme Deity is the rule rather than the exception, is one not predisposed to view such experiences as communications from the specific Deity which one has been raised to think is present and active in the world? If one is a Christian, one would be predisposed to believe it was God or the Christ, if Muslim, Allah, if Jewish, YHWH, not so?
So how, therefore, can a theologian generalise from their specific experience to a 'universal' theory of religious experience, and thus the validation of a specific framework of belief?
I mean, I've had 'religious' experiences, and I'm a freaking agnostic.**
(I was a deist at the time, and felt quite comforted by the thought that there was Something out there. I've since come to believe it was a false comfort, and self-deluding. There is no redemption and no absolution, and if nothing has meaning, then everything must, and one owes it to oneself and the world to be the best, most decent freaking human being one can be.)
I still have 'religious' experiences, in fact, only now I intrepret them in terms of fluctuations of the brain chemicals. So what makes my interpretations less valid, in the eyes of certain sections of society, than anyone else's, simply because I prefer not to believe in a Deus Pater? Or, for that matter, in the authenticity of revealed scripture?***
*
*Note that my experience and field of study is with Christian religion, and that I'm an agnostic and a skeptic by inclination. As such I hope to wear my biases on my sleeve.
**I was raised by the latest in a long line of Lapsed Catholics, attended a non-denominational - for which read Anglican - primary school and Catholic secondary one, and decided early I had no use for hypocrisy. My declared agnosticism is really a logical progression (from childhood Christianity through adolescent Deism to adult agnosticism) but you know, I still catch shit about it from some people. And not just when I call them on grounds of hypocrisy, either.
***I'm a historian-in-training. The Bible contradicts itself multiple times. If it was indeed 'inspired by God', then to paraphrase theologian Keith Ward, God was very definitely not interested in making himself clear - as a Omnipotent Being ought to be able to, if It so desired.