Plato, Apology, 27c end - 28b start

τοὺς δὲ [27δ] δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι: εἰ δ᾽ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ

Now surely don't we suppose daimons to be gods or the children of gods? Do you say so, or not?

"Indeed yes."

So if really I believe daimons exist, as you're saying, if the daimons are some kind of gods, that would be the thing that I'm saying, that you speak in riddles and mock, [that] it appears I don't believe in gods, [but] I believe in gods again, seeing as I believe in daimons: if again daimons are sort of bastard children of gods, or from nymphs or from some others which indeed they're also said [to be], who among men would believe them to be children of gods, if [he did not believe in] gods? For similarly

[27ε] ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα: ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε

it would be strange just as if someone believed in the children of horses and of asses, mules, and did not believe horses and mules existed. But, O Meletos, it is not in such a manner that you truly, making trial among us, you entered this charge, nor [is it] without means that you charge me with true wrongdoing: in such a manner you'd persuade a certain one among men who also has a small mind, so that it is not of himself to believe in both daimons and gods, and once more of himself neither

[28α] δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα: ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς

daimons nor gods nor heroes, there is not one way [to believe].

But, O Athenian men, that I do not do wrong according to the charge of Meletos, it does not seem to me much to be apology, but these things are even sufficient: that which in the things I said before, that great hatred had come into being against me, and with respect to many people, you know well that it is the truth. And this is that which convicts me, if it convicts me, not Meletos nor Anytos but the slander and ill-will of the many. That which has convicted also even many other good

[28β] ἄνδρας ᾕρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσει: οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ.

men, I think will convict [me] also: and [there is] no fear that it should stop with me.

Plato, Apology, 28b - 28c middle

[28β]ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις: ‘εἶτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν;’ ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι ‘οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι ’

So perhaps someone would say, "Then aren't you ashamed, O Socrates, practicing such business out of which you risk now to die?" And I in this I'd answer a just argument, that, "You don't speak well, O fellow, if you suppose it's necessary for a man to take account of danger of life or of death, of whom there is even a little merit, but not to consider this only, whenever he may accomplish something, whether he accomplished justice or wrongdoing, and the work of a good man or an evil one.

‘ [28ξ] γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι:

For in your argument, cheap would be those of the demigods who had met their end in Troy, the others and the son of Thetis, who so much despised danger alongside to abide any disgrace that, when his mother said to him when he was zealous to kill Hector, since she was a god, something like this, as I believe: