Further theological meanderings
Feb. 22nd, 2007 10:34 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
hawkwing_lbTheology continues to annoy and interest me in about equal measure. Our reading this week was a chapter of Keith Ward's God, Faith, and the New Millennium.
Ward's thesis is, in essence, that it is more reasonable to believe in a created, as opposed to a naturally arising, universe. (Ward is not a Biblical literalist: to him the creation myth in Genesis is simply that, a myth - albeit one that he says illustrates important spiritual truths.)
He argues for the reasonableness of this thesis through recourse to science: he argues that both science and religion have at their root the presupposition that the universe is both rational and intelligible to human minds. 'This belief that nothing happens without some explanation...has its roots in religion.' [pp 52] The whole of his argument rests, it would seem, on another statement on the same page: that 'Belief in the intelligibility of nature strongly suggests the existence of a cosmic mind that can construct nature in accordance with rational laws.'
This argument comes from several presuppositions with which I have issue:
First, that the universe is, at root, rational and intelligible;
Second, that inasmuch as nature is rational and intelligible to human minds, it is not because human minds have evolved in this matrix and hence are conditioned, by reason of their existence in a universe which conforms to certain rules to be able to understand at least some of those rules, but that the rationality of nature is external and imposed by a creator-being.
My understanding of science (as opposed to scientists) is that it is a descriptive rather than prescriptive discipline. It draws conclusions from observable evidence: it says what things are, insofar as they can be described.*
The founding principle of science is that all things which may be observed may be described.
Religion, however, is in my understanding a prescriptive rather than descriptive discipline. It says how things should be, rather than how they are. In a sense, it describes in advance of observation, and uses observation in service of its original prescription.
He argues that the idea of the universe coalescing by chance, by natural processes, is 'a rejection, at the last moment, of the quest for intelligibility that is the very foundation of science.' [pp56] 'Some physicists,' he says (with a disturbing lack of specificity) 'think that perhaps there is a necessary being,' which mandates that the universe must exist, '...some amazing mathematical equation.'[pp57] But Ward argues that 'God' is the necessary being, the originator and creator of all things. He argues that existence is an improbability out of an infinite number of improbabilities, and thus the simplest, and therefore the most probable, explanation for existence is that 'God' caused it to be.
But. I believe Ward misunderstands the nature of an infinite cosmos. If the cosmos is infinite - and not simply finite but beyond our ability to measure - then every possibility, no matter how remote, will exist not just once but an infinite number of times.
If the cosmos is, in fact, finite, then perhaps one day it will be measurable and intelligible and explainable. But not today.
I found, and find his argument for 'God' disturbing: 'Since we should always choose the hypothesis that raises the probability of the facts it is posited to explain' - that the hypothesis of a created universe raises the probability of the 'facts it is posited to explain'.
Oh, should we? Really? And here I thought that one should always choose the hypothesis that best explains the facts (the data) as one has observed them. As no one has observed the originating moment of the universe, but only the traces it has left us, it is therefore fallacious to suggest that we have anywhere near enough data to formulate a hypothesis that can adequately describe the cause of said originating moment. The existence of a necessary being is therefore no greater a possibility, scientifically speaking, than the non-existence of such a being.
So the question of 'God' and a created universe is ultimately a question of faith, not reason. Attempting to argue for 'God' or creation from any universal, objective, rational point of view is doomed to fail. The experience of 'God' is, ultimately, personal and subjective. Faith relies on lack of evidence. If there was evidence, there would be no need for faith.
I don't necessarily think that excessive faith in an otherworldly being is a good thing. I don't necessarily think it's not, either. But that's a discussion, I think, for another day.
* On the question of God, science is entirely neutral. 'God' is a phenomenon that resists measurement and description: in so much, science as a discipline is perhaps best characterised as agnostic.**
**Science is not neutral on the question of Biblical literalism. We have observed that the world is older than the Bible conceives; that speciation and evolution occurs, and other sundry contradictions inherent in a humanocentric, geocentric theology.
**
I'm not sure how many of the few people who read this blog I a)offend, b)interest, c)bore, or d)some combination of the above with these posts about my response to my theology course. I'd be interested to find out.
Ward's thesis is, in essence, that it is more reasonable to believe in a created, as opposed to a naturally arising, universe. (Ward is not a Biblical literalist: to him the creation myth in Genesis is simply that, a myth - albeit one that he says illustrates important spiritual truths.)
He argues for the reasonableness of this thesis through recourse to science: he argues that both science and religion have at their root the presupposition that the universe is both rational and intelligible to human minds. 'This belief that nothing happens without some explanation...has its roots in religion.' [pp 52] The whole of his argument rests, it would seem, on another statement on the same page: that 'Belief in the intelligibility of nature strongly suggests the existence of a cosmic mind that can construct nature in accordance with rational laws.'
This argument comes from several presuppositions with which I have issue:
First, that the universe is, at root, rational and intelligible;
Second, that inasmuch as nature is rational and intelligible to human minds, it is not because human minds have evolved in this matrix and hence are conditioned, by reason of their existence in a universe which conforms to certain rules to be able to understand at least some of those rules, but that the rationality of nature is external and imposed by a creator-being.
My understanding of science (as opposed to scientists) is that it is a descriptive rather than prescriptive discipline. It draws conclusions from observable evidence: it says what things are, insofar as they can be described.*
The founding principle of science is that all things which may be observed may be described.
Religion, however, is in my understanding a prescriptive rather than descriptive discipline. It says how things should be, rather than how they are. In a sense, it describes in advance of observation, and uses observation in service of its original prescription.
He argues that the idea of the universe coalescing by chance, by natural processes, is 'a rejection, at the last moment, of the quest for intelligibility that is the very foundation of science.' [pp56] 'Some physicists,' he says (with a disturbing lack of specificity) 'think that perhaps there is a necessary being,' which mandates that the universe must exist, '...some amazing mathematical equation.'[pp57] But Ward argues that 'God' is the necessary being, the originator and creator of all things. He argues that existence is an improbability out of an infinite number of improbabilities, and thus the simplest, and therefore the most probable, explanation for existence is that 'God' caused it to be.
But. I believe Ward misunderstands the nature of an infinite cosmos. If the cosmos is infinite - and not simply finite but beyond our ability to measure - then every possibility, no matter how remote, will exist not just once but an infinite number of times.
If the cosmos is, in fact, finite, then perhaps one day it will be measurable and intelligible and explainable. But not today.
I found, and find his argument for 'God' disturbing: 'Since we should always choose the hypothesis that raises the probability of the facts it is posited to explain' - that the hypothesis of a created universe raises the probability of the 'facts it is posited to explain'.
Oh, should we? Really? And here I thought that one should always choose the hypothesis that best explains the facts (the data) as one has observed them. As no one has observed the originating moment of the universe, but only the traces it has left us, it is therefore fallacious to suggest that we have anywhere near enough data to formulate a hypothesis that can adequately describe the cause of said originating moment. The existence of a necessary being is therefore no greater a possibility, scientifically speaking, than the non-existence of such a being.
So the question of 'God' and a created universe is ultimately a question of faith, not reason. Attempting to argue for 'God' or creation from any universal, objective, rational point of view is doomed to fail. The experience of 'God' is, ultimately, personal and subjective. Faith relies on lack of evidence. If there was evidence, there would be no need for faith.
I don't necessarily think that excessive faith in an otherworldly being is a good thing. I don't necessarily think it's not, either. But that's a discussion, I think, for another day.
* On the question of God, science is entirely neutral. 'God' is a phenomenon that resists measurement and description: in so much, science as a discipline is perhaps best characterised as agnostic.**
**Science is not neutral on the question of Biblical literalism. We have observed that the world is older than the Bible conceives; that speciation and evolution occurs, and other sundry contradictions inherent in a humanocentric, geocentric theology.
**
I'm not sure how many of the few people who read this blog I a)offend, b)interest, c)bore, or d)some combination of the above with these posts about my response to my theology course. I'd be interested to find out.
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no subject
Date: 2007-02-23 02:14 am (UTC)The word "intelligible" here is very dangerous. It means understand, but when someone says they understand something, they understand it in the sense that they understand it. When I say I understand omeletes, I'm not saying that I know their chemical composition, how the atoms are bonded, or the fundamental nature that allows omelets to persist until eaten. I'm just saying I know that they have eggs and other stuff and I know how they're made.
So, sure, we're aware of the universe to the extent that we're aware of it. What you can derive about the universe about that, I wouldn't want to say.
no subject
Date: 2007-02-23 10:36 am (UTC)So, sure, we're aware of the universe to the extent that we're aware of it. What you can derive about the universe about that, I wouldn't want to say.
I'm personally convinced that claiming that human minds can completely understand the totallity of the cosmos is, well, excessively arrogant. :)